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Probability, Individualization, and 
Uniqueness in Forensic Science 
Evidence 
LISTENING TO THE ACADEMIES* 
David H. Kaye† 
INTRODUCTION 
These are dark days for the forensic sciences. 
Newspaper and magazine articles, op-ed headlines, television 
news, and radio talk shows refer to the field as “seriously 
deficient,”1 a “dismal science,”2 “in disarray,”3 even “clueless.”4 
The stimulus for this negative publicity blitz is a report of a 
congressionally-mandated “independent forensic science 
committee at the National Academy of Sciences.”5 This belated 
report6 calls for structural and cultural changes in the forensic 
science community ranging from the separation of laboratories 
and police departments, to a uniform, enforceable code of 
ethics7 and standardized testimony.8 The report found that:  
  
 * © 2009 D.H. Kaye. All rights reserved. 
 † Distinguished Professor of Law, Weiss Family Scholar, and Graduate 
Faculty, Forensic Science Program, Pennsylvania State University. I am grateful to 
Jay Koehler and Stephen Stigler for comments on a draft of this paper.  
 1 Pete Williams, Crime Labs Are Seriously Deficient, Report Says: National 
Academy of Science Says Only DNA Evidence Is Dependable, MSNBC, Feb. 18, 2002, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29258576/. 
 2 On Point: Crime Labs and Dismal Science, (Nat’l Public Radio broadcast 
Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://www.onpointradio.org/shows/2009/02/dismal-science/. 
 3 Martha Neil, Crime Labs in Disarray Nationally; Reform, Independence 
Needed, Report Says, A.B.A.J. L. NEWS NOW, Feb. 18, 2009, http://abajournal.com/ 
news/crime_labs_in_disarray_nationally_reform_needed_report_says/. 
 4 Jennifer L. Mnookin, Op-Ed., Clueless ‘Science’, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/19/opinion/oe-mnookin19. 
 5 The National Academies, Project: Identifying the Needs of the Forensic 
Science Community, http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=48741 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 6 The report originally was scheduled for January 2008. See id. (announcing 
a starting date of September 2006 for a project of 16 months duration). 
 7 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE 
FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
 
1164 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
The forensic science disciplines exhibit wide variability with regard 
to techniques, methodologies, reliability, level of error, research, 
general acceptability, and published material. . . . Many of the 
processes used in the forensic science disciplines are . . . not based on 
a body of knowledge that recognizes the underlying limitations of the 
scientific principles and methodologies for problem solving and 
discovery. . . . [S]ome of these activities [encompassed by the term 
“forensic science”] might not have a well developed research base, 
are not informed by scientific knowledge, or are not developed within 
the culture of science.9 
These observations are hardly news to the other 
academy—the professoriate. For years, the authors of legal 
treatises and journals have complained bitterly about the lack 
of regulation of forensic laboratories, the absence of rigorous 
proficiency testing, and the dearth of basic research that would 
demonstrate the alleged ability of fingerprint, toolmark, and 
other analysts to identify traces from one person or object to 
the exclusion of all others in the world.10 They have written 
dismissively of “nonscience forensic sciences” that “have little 
or no basis in actual science,” and they have implored courts to 
exclude testimony, pending better research showing that 
analysts can live up to their claims.11 With rare exceptions, 
however, the courts have failed to perceive the gap between 
  
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 26 (2009) [hereinafter NRC 2009], available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12589&page=R1. 
 8 Id. at 21 (“The terminology used in reporting and testifying about the 
results of forensic science investigations must be standardized.”).  
 9 Id. at 38-39. 
 10 A small sample of this literature includes D.H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW 
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE (2004); MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David Faigman et al. eds., 
2008-2009 edition); Simon A. Cole, Is Fingerprint Identification Valid? Rhetorics of 
Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents’ Discourse, 28 L. & POL’Y 109 (2006); Craig M. 
Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Community to Avert the Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 381 (2004); Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: 
The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The 
Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 
7 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 127 (2008); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The 
Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892 (2005). 
 11 E.g., Simon A. Cole, Does “Yes” Really Mean Yes? The Attempt to Close 
Debate on the Admissibility of Fingerprint Testimony, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 449 (2005); 
Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Experiential or Scientific Expertise, 7 L., 
PROBABILITY & RISK 143 (2008); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and 
Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA 
L. REV. 21 (1996); Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and 
Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
1, 1 (2005) (“[A]ll firearms and toolmark identifications should be excluded until 
adequate statistical empirical foundations and proficiency testing are developed for the 
field.”). 
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optimistic theory and hard proof, and they have accepted 
remarkably weak forms of validation.12 
With the imprimatur of the National Academy of 
Sciences behind recommendations for major change, the need 
for forensic scientists or analysts to retreat from the most 
extreme claims finally should be apparent to the judiciary as 
well as the forensic science community. But how far should this 
retreat go? Should forensic scientists be forever barred from 
giving an opinion that a DNA sample, a fingerprint, or a 
broken part of an object originated from a particular person, 
finger, or matching object? What does it take to justify such 
opinions? This essay seeks to clarify these questions by 
scrutinizing several statements and recommendations on how 
to present testimony offered in an essay by two of the legal 
academy’s foremost critics of contemporary forensic science. In 
The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science (“Fallacy”),13 
Professors Michael Saks and Jay Koehler make the following 
statements: 
(1) The concept of “individualization,” which lies at the core of 
numerous forensic science subfields, exists only in a metaphysical or 
rhetorical sense. It has no scientific validity, and it is sustained 
largely by the faulty logic that equates infrequency with 
uniqueness.14 
(2) [A]pplication of the product rule necessarily falls short of 
establishing unique individualization. The product of probabilities 
greater than zero always yields a value greater than zero. The 
probabilistic approach, therefore, always leads to the conclusion that 
a source other than the suspected individual or object might exist.15 
(3) The claim of unique individuality cannot be proven with 
samples . . . . “It is impossible to prove any human characteristic to 
be distinct in each individual without checking every 
individual . . . .” Anything less results in probability statements 
rather than conclusions of absolute specificity and absolute 
identification.16 
  
 12 See, e.g., D.H. KAYE ET AL., supra note 10; 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 10, at 276-77; 
Mnookin, supra note 10, at 127-29. 
 13 Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in 
Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008). 
 14 Id. at 205. 
 15 Id. at 209 (footnote omitted). 
 16 Id. at 211 (footnote omitted). After asserting that sampling is incapable of 
proving uniqueness, the first sentence adds that this is “especially” so for “samples that 
are a tiny proportion of the relevant population.” Id. 
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(4) [A]s Karl Popper famously explained, it is logically impossible to 
prove a hypothesis by accumulating positive instances. The 
hypothesis, “all swans are white,” remains unproven, even after a 
large number of sightings of white swans, because the sighting of a 
single black swan would disprove it. Similarly, the hypothesis that 
no two objects are indistinguishably alike cannot be proven true 
from an accumulation of observations in which different object 
sources produce distinctive markings.17 
(5) Even a very large number of pairwise, case-by-case comparisons 
made by individual examiners would not provide a satisfactory 
method for testing the object uniqueness claim.18 
Although I agree with the critique of a great deal of 
forensic science testimony, to the extent that these statements 
imply that, even in principle, science cannot establish the 
uniqueness of objects, I am dubious. In addition, 
individualization—the conclusion that “this trace came from 
this individual or this object”—is not the same as, and need not 
depend on, the belief in universal uniqueness.19 Consequently, 
there are circumstances in which an analyst reasonably can 
testify to having determined the source of an object, whether or 
not uniqueness is demonstrable. Part I of this essay shows why 
the arguments for radical skepticism of uniqueness are not 
convincing. Part II explains the distinction between 
individualization and uniqueness. It explicates what I believe 
to be the real individualization fallacy—the putatively sharp 
dichotomy between class and individual characteristics. Part 
III applies these ideas to courtroom testimony and argues that 
a variety of courtroom explanations of the meaning of a match 
should be permissible. 
I. PROVING UNIQUENESS 
A. Metaphysics 
If all that a criminalist can say is that, in some 
untestable ways, no two objects are the same, then the 
testimony should be excluded as irrelevant and as not 
constituting specialized “knowledge” within the meaning of 
  
 17 Id. at 212 (footnotes omitted). 
 18 Id. 
 19 On a more restricted meaning of “individualization” in forensic science, see, 
for example, John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and 
Rationale of Forensic Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND 
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 10, at 1, 11. 
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Rule 702 of the Federal or Uniform Rules of Evidence.20 
Courtroom claims of individuality, however, necessarily have to 
do with measurable characteristics that can exhibit 
unequivocal differences and similarities.21 For example, in 
1992, a committee of the National Academy of Sciences (the 
“NAS”) recommended that “[c]ourts should take judicial notice 
of [the] scientific underpinnings of DNA typing”—including the 
fact that “[e]ach person’s DNA is unique (except that of 
identical twins) . . . .”22 Although we lack the technology to 
generate error-free sequences of the more than six billion base 
pairs that constitute diploid human genomes, in principle, the 
claim of individuality can be refuted by a much improved 
sequencing experiment that establishes perfect congruence in 
two individual genomes. The NAS committee’s 
individualization hypothesis—which is standard fare in human 
genetics—could be wrong, but it is not metaphysical.23 
B. The Product Rule and Nonzero Probabilities 
Saks and Koehler’s second point is that uniqueness is 
beyond the realm of proof because “[t]he product of 
probabilities greater than zero always yields a value greater 
than zero. The probabilistic approach, therefore, always leads 
to the conclusion that a source other than the suspected 
individual or object might exist.”24  
This argument proves too much. If the problem is 
simply that another source might exist, then the fallacy infects 
all scientific research and testimony. There is always some 
nonzero probability of an erroneous conclusion. Ohm’s law 
  
 20 Cf. D.H. Kaye, On “Falsification” and “Falsifiability”: The First Daubert 
Factor and the Philosophy of Science, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 473 (2005) (discussing the 
importance and meaning of falsifiability for scientific knowledge). 
 21 See, e.g., Michael G. Koot et al., Radiographic Human Identification Using 
Bones of the Hand: A Validation Study, 50 J. FORENSIC SCI. 263, 263-64 (2005) 
(suggesting that “skeletal features formed in late childhood remain unique throughout 
life” on the basis, in part, of a previous analysis of 40 pairs of hand radiographs of 
same-sex, identical twins for which “there were, in every instance, some features which 
made it possible to distinguish the hand and wrist bones of one person from those of his 
or her own twin”). This limited study falls woefully short of demonstrating uniqueness, 
but the logic of looking at identical twins for differences is sound. 
 22 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., DNA 
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 23 (1992) [hereinafter NRC 1992]. 
 23 In describing certain claims of uniqueness as “not metaphysical,” I am 
responding to “the impression that metaphysics is a study that somehow ‘goes beyond’ 
physics.” Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/. 
 24 Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 209. 
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might not be exactly right, or it might break down tomorrow, 
but electrical engineers can safely assume that it is absolutely 
true.25 Returning to forensic science, was it fallacious for the 
1992 NAS committee to represent that an individual’s full 
genome is unique? A researcher applying standard statistical 
reasoning would reject the hypothesis of duplication vis-à-vis 
the alternative hypothesis of uniqueness when the probability 
of duplication in the population is small enough. A second NAS 
committee suggested that “[w]ith an increasing number of loci 
available for forensic analysis, we are approaching the time 
when each person’s profile will be unique (except for identical 
twins and other close relatives).”26 Its 1996 report distinguished 
between specific and general claims of uniqueness. A specific 
profile might be unique: “Suppose that, in a population of N 
unrelated persons, a given DNA profile has probability P. The 
probability (before a suspect has been profiled) that the 
particular profile observed in the evidence sample is not unique 
is at most NP.”27 A small probability NP indicates that the one 
profile under consideration is likely to be unique within a 
population that contains as many as N unrelated people. This 
is uniqueness conditioned on a given genotype. 
General uniqueness refers to all the profiles in the 
population. “A lower bound on the probability that every person 
is unique depends on the population size, the number of loci, 
and the heterozygosity of the individual loci.”28 With some 
simplifying assumptions, the probability of this event also can 
be estimated. “Neglecting population structure and close 
relatives, 10 loci with a geometric mean heterozygosity of 95% 
  
 25 In their rejoinder in this issue of the Law Review, Professors Koehler and 
Saks question whether Ohm’s law (as opposed to say, the subsequent example of the 
laws of electromagnetism) is a good illustration of the common practice of expressing 
textbook knowledge as established scientific fact. Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. 
Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1187, 1203-04 (2010). They are correct in criticizing this first example. More 
dubious, however, is their insistence that “[t]he implication is that even if forensic 
examiners can’t be 100% sure of their ability to individualize, they are safe in 
proceeding on the assumption that their individualization conclusions are absolutely 
true.” Id. at 1203. Whether it is safe to accept any scientific statement obviously 
depends on its foundation. See infra note 45. As the next sentence in the text and the 
larger discussion plainly indicate, the only implication of these examples is that, in 
appropriate circumstances, statements of uniqueness (such as the textbook claims 
about human genomes) could be accepted as true despite a nonzero probability that 
they are false.  
 26 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI., AN UPDATE, THE 
EVALUATION OF DNA EVIDENCE 161 (1996) [hereinafter NRC 1996]. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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give a probability greater than about 0.999 that no two 
unrelated people in the world have the same profile.”29  
For Saks and Koehler, however, no probability of 
duplication is small enough to warrant an opinion that DNA or 
anything else is unique. Thus, they reject the reasoning that a 
“probability of two individuals having the same fingerprint is 
one out of 1 × 1060 . . . is so small as to exclude the possibility of 
any two individuals having the same fingerprints.”30 They are 
correct, but only in the trivial sense that every event with a 
nonzero probability is a “possibility.” P = 10–60 is supposed to be 
the probability that two randomly selected people will have 
matching fingerprints. Although I doubt the accuracy of the 
estimated match probability,31 the allegedly “faulty logic”32—the 
move from P = 10–60 for the probability of a match to a randomly 
selected pair to zero for the probability of a match for all 
possible pairs—is defensible. Suppose that the world’s 
population (N) is seven billion. The number of distinct pairs of 
people is N(N – 1)/2, which is on the order of 1019. Even for this 
many comparisons, when each has only a probability of 10–60 of 
being the same, the chance of one or more identical fingerprints 
in the world’s population is about 10–41.33 Technically, this 
  
 29 Id. The computation, “an application of the ‘birthday problem’ with 
unequal probabilities,” can be found in appendix 5C of the report. More STR loci (the 
type currently used in DNA identification) would be required to achieve the same 
probability of uniqueness. See id. at 165; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12.5.3. 
 30 Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 203 (quoting RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, 
CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 73 (9th ed. 2007)). 
 31 If we truly could believe that the chance of the fingerprints of any two 
different people matching were 10–60, we could—and should—believe in the uniqueness 
of fingerprints. Whether fingerprint examiners reliably can differentiate latent prints 
at the level of detail needed to give rise to probabilities such as 10–60 is obviously 
another story (and not a very believable one). See generally David H. Kaye, From 
Snowflakes to Fingerprints: A Dubious Courtroom Proof of the Uniqueness of 
Fingerprints, 71 INT’L STAT. REV. 521, 524 (2003) (criticizing an unpublished study by 
an FBI contractor introduced by the Department of Justice and relied on by federal 
courts to show “that the probability of finding two people with identical fingerprints 
was one in ten to the ninety-seventh power [and] that the probability of finding two 
different, partial fingerprints to be identical was one in ten to the twenty-seventh 
power.”); see also Christophe Champod, Fingerprint Examination: Towards More 
Transparency, 7 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 111, 113 (2008) (“Systematic research on the 
selectivity of fingerprint features [indicates] that even very limited configurations of 
fingerprint minutiae can provide . . . match probabilities on the order of 1 in a billion, 
even without considering the statistical contribution of level 1 features (general 
pattern, ridge counts, etc.) or other fingerprint features if available.”). 
 32 Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 204. 
 33 Intuitively, if each comparison has the same tiny probability P of producing 
a match and we have made n comparisons, then the probability of at least one match is 
close to nP. See Frederick Mosteller, Understanding the Birthday Problem, 55 MATH. 
TEACHER 322 (1962) (eqn. 7), reprinted in SELECTED PAPERS OF FREDERICK MOSTELLER 
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probability is greater than zero, but that mathematical truism 
hardly makes it fallacious to exclude as totally unrealistic the 
thought of a matching fingerprint from someone else. It is not a 
fallacy to infer uniqueness (both specific and general) when the 
match probability P is immensely smaller than the reciprocal of 
the size of a population of objects, every one of whose members 
has the small probability P of matching.34  
Thus, the problem with using probability theory to 
demonstrate uniqueness is not that the probability of 
duplication always exceeds zero. The difference might be too 
small to matter. Such demonstrations are generally 
unconvincing because it is so hard to establish that the models 
are sufficiently realistic and accurate to trust the computed 
probabilities. But sometimes probabilities are negligible. Just 
think about the chance that you would suffocate because all the 
nearby molecules of oxygen in the room would happen to move 
to the other half of the room. A few simple assumptions and a 
bit of statistical mechanics demonstrate that the possibility 
need not worry us. 
C. Direct Testing (Sampling) 
Saks and Koehler’s remaining arguments (3 through 5) 
boil down to the claim that sample data cannot establish the 
exact proportion of an entire population that shares a given 
characteristic. Uniqueness means that the proportion of objects 
with the given feature in the whole population of size N is 
exactly 1/N. Yet, no matter how close the sample proportion 
comes to 1/N, the next sample datum could establish that the 
population proportion is 2/N or more.  
Again, this is true but not indicative of faulty reasoning. 
Certainly, there are reasons to distrust the “it hasn’t happened 
yet” theory of uniqueness. Fallacy cogently explains the 
limitations of unsystematic, “pairwise, case-by-case 
comparisons made by individual examiners,”35 and it points to 
  
349, 351 (Stephen E. Fienberg & David Caster Hoaglin eds., 2006). For n = 1019 and P = 
10–60, this gives 10–41. (A more precise calculation gives a value with the same order of 
magnitude.) Since the probability of the world’s population having distinct fingerprints 
differs from 1 by a mere 10–41, for all practical (and impractical) purposes, fingerprints 
are globally unique—that is, if people are assigned fingerprint patterns by a process 
that is equivalent to randomly sampling an infinite population in which the 1060 
distinct patterns are uniformly distributed. 
 34 See DAVID J. BALDING, WEIGHT-OF-EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC DNA PROFILES 
148 (2005). 
 35 Id. 
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contradictory reports of matches in trace evidence coming from 
different individuals.36 These are reasons enough for 
skepticism, but the white swans and the insistence that only a 
census will do the job makes it look as if the examiners are 
pursuing a line of proof that is logically incapable of supporting 
the desired inference. The flaw is not with the logic. It is with 
the data.37 The number of comparisons required to prove 
uniqueness by brute empirical force (that is, to make the 
normal statistical inference from a sample to a population) is 
surprisingly larger than one might think.38 It takes a random-
match probability whose reciprocal is orders of magnitude 
larger than the population of objects to make uniqueness 
almost certain.39  
But this difficulty with a direct empirical proof is not 
tantamount to Popper’s realization that universal laws cannot 
be proved to a logical certainty by simple induction.40 Modern 
science is full of universal laws. The laws of electromagnetism, 
for instance, remain unproven and unprovable in Popper’s 
logical sense.41 The only universal propositions that can be 
proven to a certainty are deductively valid ones, such as the 
theorem that all whole numbers that end in an even digit are 
divisible by two. No experimentation is required to test this 
law. In contrast, no matter how many times scientists observe 
that a change in the magnetic flux in a coil or wire induces a 
voltage, they cannot be certain that it will happen the next 
time. In principle, a single experiment with no change in 
voltage would disprove Faraday’s Law.42  
In Popper’s framework, the repeated failure of forensic 
examiners to find “two sets of markings produced by different 
  
 36 Id. at 213. 
 37 Fallacy can be read this way as well. See id. (“As the size of a comparison 
database becomes larger, the object uniqueness hypothesis is subjected to an 
increasingly tough empirical test. If, under these circumstances, scientists still do not 
find indistinguishably similar matches produced by different objects, then object 
uniqueness becomes a more credible theory.”). 
 38 Id. at 203-04 (describing a version of the “birthday problem” in probability 
theory). 
 39 Id. at 148. 
 40 Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 212. 
 41 See id. 
 42 Id. In practice, a single experiment would not suffice. Effects that cannot 
be replicated are likely to be the result of experimental error. Because data gathering 
is fallible, a single sighting of a black swan might not be enough to disprove the 
hypothesis that all swans are white. The observer might have been mistaken about the 
bird (it was not really a swan) or its true color (it had flown through a cloud of soot). 
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sources that are indistinguishable from each other”43 lends 
some support to the generalization that all different sources 
produce distinguishable markings. His swan example merely 
shows that we never can be absolutely certain of any 
generalization. If that is all that the individualization fallacy 
consists of, then all induction is fallacious. “[T]he faulty logic 
that equates infrequency with uniqueness” is not a logical 
fallacy.44 
The threshold issue for the law, therefore, is not the 
impossibility of falsifying universal propositions. It is whether 
criminalists are warranted in believing, as a practical matter, 
that certain universals (everyone has different fingerprints, 
everyone other than identical twins have different genomes, 
every face is unique, and so on) are true.45 If these beliefs are 
warranted, and if criminalists can measure the features that 
give rise to these differences with sufficient accuracy, then 
their claims to be able to individualize are sound. If these 
beliefs outstrip available theory and knowledge, as Saks and 
Koehler claim and as the NAS committee agrees (except, it 
  
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. at 205. A fallacy in logic is a faulty form of reasoning, not merely a 
conclusion that might be faulty. In a system of inductive logic, there is no formal fallacy 
in generalizing from repeated observations. Sample data permit inferences about 
population parameters—including the parameter that a characteristic occurs only once 
in the population. Naturally, there is a nonzero risk of error in accepting any inference 
about any population parameter. “The gap between the sample and the population will 
always require a leap of faith.” PHILLIP I. GOOD & JAMES W. HARDIN, COMMON ERRORS 
IN STATISTICS (AND HOW TO AVOID THEM) 74 (2003). The only issue worth debating is 
the length of the leap. 
 45 Koehler and Saks read this sentence and personal correspondence not 
intended for publication as indicating that I use the words “establish the truth” to 
mean, in their words, “something . . . akin to a strong personal belief that has a solid 
foundation in data.” Koehler & Saks, supra note 25, at 1196 n.35. In contrast, they 
define “establish the truth” to mean “that all point predictions other than the target 
prediction have been ruled out by the data,” and they “simply do not accept [my] 
weakened definitional form of ‘establish the truth.’” Id. This characterization prompts a 
brief clarification. Clearly, the warrant for a scientific belief or statement is not the 
strength of the conviction of the scientist who holds it. Neither does the warrant lie in 
vague allusions to “training and experience.” Id. at 1197. Rather the question is 
whether the proposition has a secure foundation in data and theory. For most (and 
arguably all) forensic identification techniques, this foundation for strong claims of 
global uniqueness is missing. However, I do not embrace the rigid “definitional” view 
that a census is required to establish the likely truth (and what other kind of truth is 
there in science?) with respect to “all point predictions other than the target 
prediction.” Id. at 1196 n.35. For example, if the probability of duplication really were 
as small as 10−41, see supra note 33, then the competing hypotheses effectively would 
have been ruled out, and the belief in the “target prediction” would be warranted.  
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seems, for DNA evidence),46 then the beliefs are either 
premature or false. 
II. INDIVIDUALIZATION WITHOUT UNIQUENESS 
Part I distinguished between claims of general 
uniqueness (no two pairs anywhere match) and specific 
uniqueness (no other object matches the particular trace seen 
in the case at bar). I argued that although general uniqueness 
is much more difficult to establish, an inductive proof of it is 
not beyond the capacity of science.47  
That said, the fact that general uniqueness is so hard to 
prove makes the traditional reasoning of many forensic-
identification practitioners suspect, if not dogmatic. Rather 
than conduct the difficult empirical research that would be 
needed to establish that these objects or impressions are all 
uniquely identifiable, they postulate general uniqueness and 
use it to infer that a match then proves that a hair, a fiber, or 
the mark must have originated from the source that it 
matches. In the absence of proof of the premise of general 
uniqueness, however, this reasoning is insecure and might well 
be denominated an individualization fallacy.  
Furthermore, the widely used distinction between 
“class” and “individual” characteristics48 encourages this 
individualization fallacy. The theory is that a large number of 
objects share class characteristics (such as shoe size), while 
other features (such as the scratches on the sole of a shoe) are 
individual characteristics. This definitional system promotes 
such tautologies as “[t]he uniqueness of an object may be 
established by an ensemble of individual [as opposed to class] 
characteristics.”49 Blithely postulating uniqueness in this 
manner, forensic science textbooks contain advice such as the 
following: “A positive identification is a conclusion that a 
  
 46 NRC 2009, supra note 7, at 87 (“[N]o forensic method other than nuclear 
DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently and with 
a high degree of certainty support conclusions about ‘individualization’ . . . .”). 
 47 Additional analysis of conceptions of uniqueness and their relationship to 
individualization can be found in David H. Kaye, Identification, Individualization, and 
Uniqueness: What’s the Difference?, 8 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 85 (2009) (distinguishing 
between “universal individualization” and “local individualization,” between “general 
uniqueness” and “special uniqueness,” and between “universal uniqueness” and “local 
uniqueness”). 
 48 See, e.g., Thornton & Peterson, supra note 19, § 29:7, at 8 (describing the 
distinction and its use in the process of comparison). 
 49 Id. 
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particular shoe, and no other shoe, made the crime scene 
impression. No minimum number of individual identifying 
characteristics is needed to establish a positive identification.”50 
It would be better to eschew the class-individual distinction in 
favor of the realization that all characteristics are class ones. 
What matters is the size of the class. Some features are more 
discriminating than others. Shoe size, for example, is known to 
be shared by many objects. It can be extremely valuable and 
easily used in excluding a given individual or object from 
further investigation.51 (If the shoe does not fit, you must 
acquit.) It also has rather modest probative value in showing 
that a specific individual or object is the source of the trace 
evidence. (Even if the shoe fits, you need not convict.) Other 
characteristics are far more variable. These supposedly 
“individual” characteristics pertain to a much smaller class (a 
class of one in the limit). As such, they have much greater 
probative value in establishing an association between two 
items than do the “class” characteristics that define a larger 
class.52  
But even if the traditional class-individual distinction 
begs the question of global uniqueness, a scientifically 
defensible opinion as to individualization is still attainable in 
some situations.53 This is the case for two reasons. First, 
testimony that a particular item is unique is a much weaker 
claim than testimony that all items are unique. Second, 
contrary to the loose or elliptical statements of many forensic 
scientists,54 individualization does not presuppose or imply even 
conditional uniqueness in a finite set. Suppose that a man 
suspected of stealing a jewel on a cruise ship has a fingerprint 
pattern that matches the latent print on the drawer from 
which the jewel was stolen and that there were 2500 people on 
board the ship at the time. Two thousand of them are 
fingerprinted, and only one is found to match. The other 500 
people cannot be located. If the quality of the prints is high, the 
probability of a match to any of the 500 missing people could be 
  
 50 William J. Bodziak, Forensic Footwear Evidence, in FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC AND INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES 297, 309 (Stuart H. 
James & Jon J. Nordby eds., 2003); see also id. at 298. 
 51 See e.g., Thornton & Peterson, supra note 19, § 29:7, at 8. 
 52 This perspective is congruent with Saks and Koehler’s emphasis on 
probability statements. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 211.  
 53 For a more detailed discussion, see generally Kaye, supra note 47. 
 54 E.g., Thornton & Peterson, supra note 19, § 29:10, at 11 (“Individualization 
implies uniqueness.”). 
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miniscule. It then would be reasonable to conclude that the 
fingerprint examiner has identified the one individual who left 
the print. This is an individualization even though it does not 
imply that no one else on the earth has the same prints.55 
It might be thought that the cruise-ship example is 
contrived, but the point is more general. Following the 
invitation of the 1996 NRC report, FBI examiners, focusing on 
conditional uniqueness, have testified to source identifications 
in cases for which they consider the duplication probability for 
a particular profile in the United States population to be quite 
small.56 The 2009 report also seems comfortable with such 
testimony.57 Yet, the Saks-and-Koehler argument that any 
nonzero probability makes an assertion fallacious applies to 
DNA,58 and Fallacy brands an opinion that a defendant is the 
source of a DNA sample as “an evasion” of science.59  
  
 55 Cf. IAN W. EVETT & BRUCE S. WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: 
STATISTICAL GENETICS FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 239 (1998) (“The issue for the 
forensic scientist is not ‘Is this profile unique’ . . . but ‘Is there sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that they originate from the identical source.’”). Koehler and Saks object 
to using the word “individualization” to denote such testimony. They write that 
The definition that Professor Kaye relies on reduces individualization to a 
subjective belief that is bolstered by evidence that falls far short of sufficient 
proof for this extreme claim. The difference between individualization as it is 
commonly understood and the definition offered by Professor Kaye is the 
difference between claiming that Alberto is the tallest man in the world 
because his measured height is greater than every other person in the world, 
and claiming that Alberto is the tallest man in the world either because an 
insufficiently tested theory assumes he is or because we have not seen 
anyone taller among those we have looked at. 
Koehler & Saks, supra note 25, at 1201. This seems exactly backwards. Most critics 
maintain that it is the current definition of “individualization”—the “commonly 
understood” one described by Koehler and Saks—that produces testimony of 
identification based on subjective determinations that lack rigorous support. Relying 
on “subjective belief” and studies that fall “far short” is not a consequence of defining 
“an individualization” as a determination that one and only one individual is the source 
of the trace evidence in the case at bar. Similarly, this easily understood definition does 
not commit one to unsubstantiated claims about Alberto’s height or to “personal 
feelings or hunches.” Id. Neither Professors Koehler and Saks nor the last generation 
of forensic scientists can, by definitional fiat, confine the words “individualize” or 
“identify” to assertions based on the postulate of global uniqueness.  
 56 Roberto Suro, DNA Now Used to Make Specific Identification; FBI Calls 
Lab Match “Major Breakthrough”, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1997, at A4. Courts have 
upheld these source attributions despite defense arguments that untested relatives 
might match or that the laboratory could have erred. United States v. Davis, 602 F. 
Supp. 2d 658, 683-85 (D. Md. 2009); Young v. State, 879 A.2d 44, 56 (Md. 2005). 
 57 See supra note 46. 
 58 They also describe a different fallacy with regard to DNA evidence, 
exemplified by the prosecutor’s closing argument in People v. Simpson that if the 
random-match probability is one in 57 billion, the population must exceed 57 billion for 
a duplicate to exist. Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 203. As they cogently explain, 
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In sum, a well founded and extremely tiny random-
match probability indicates that, even if some other pairs of 
objects do match, the match at issue is not merely a 
coincidence; rather, it is a true association to a single source.60 
In appropriate cases, therefore, it is ethical and scientifically 
sound for an expert witness to offer an opinion as to the source 
of the trace evidence. Of course, it would be more precise to 
present the random-match probability instead of the 
qualitative statement, but scientists speak of many 
propositions that are merely highly likely as if they have been 
proved. They are practicing rather than evading science when 
they round off in this fashion.  
This is not to say that such testimony is the best method 
of communicating the test results to a lay jury. There is a 
cogent argument that such opinions are not helpful when more 
precise indications of probative value are available to permit 
the jury to reach its own conclusion about the source of the 
trace evidence.61 At this point, however, we are moving from 
what is scientifically acceptable to what is legally optimal. This 
  
the mere fact that the expected number of individuals on Earth with a specific DNA 
type is less than the world’s population does not mean that there can be no duplication. 
Id. At some point, however, the probability of duplication becomes so small that it is 
fair to dismiss this hypothesis as implausible. Id. Existing random-match probabilities 
for DNA evidence may have reached the point where an expert can opine that a profile 
is unique to an individual (and any identical twins). See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 185 
P.3d 49, 52 (Cal. 2008) (“The prosecution presented evidence that the odds that a 
random person unrelated to defendant . . . could have fit the profile of some of the 
crime scene evidence are one in 930 sextillion (93 followed by 22 zeros).”); State v. 
Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 160 n.2 (Minn. 1994) (“Dr. [Daniel] Hartl, if permitted, would 
further testify at trial that in fact there was a nine-loci match and that in his opinion 
the nine-loci match constituted ‘overwhelming evidence that, to a reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty, the DNA from the victim’s vaginal swab came from [defendant], to 
the exclusion of all others.’”). However, one should take all the zeroes in the estimates 
like those in Nelson with a proverbial grain of salt. See, e.g., Peter J. Bickel, Discussion 
of “The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence”, 94 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5497 (1997) 
(“[M]any scientists would not agree that the modeling assumptions . . . can be verified 
to hold so precisely that the match probabilities can be ascertained to an order of 1 in 
one billion.”). 
 59 Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 218 n.94. In doing so, they part company 
with the statistician whose exposition of “the uniqueness fallacy” motivates their 
putative fallacy. See BALDING, supra note 34, at 148 (describing as “reasonable” the 
judgment that a characteristic is unique when it is “several orders of magnitude 
smaller” than the random match probability). 
 60 This inference assumes that other hypotheses (handling error, fraud, etc.) 
also have been eliminated. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12.3.1. 
 61 See, e.g., EVETT & WEIR, supra note 55, at 241 (“Once we assign a 
[probability] then we must recognize that we have given the court something that they 
may choose to work with or without our assistance. Certainly, the idea that the 
scientist has some particular power to take that number and take a step equivalent to 
the Stoney ‘leap of faith’ is misconceived.”). 
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argument should be addressed on its merits and not foreclosed 
as an unscientific option. 
III. PRESENTING LIMITED KNOWLEDGE IN COURT 
The NAS committee recommends that “[f]orensic 
reports, and any courtroom testimony stemming from them, 
must include clear characterizations of the limitations of the 
analyses, including measures of uncertainty in reported results 
and associated estimated probabilities where possible.”62 Saks 
and Koehler likewise implore criminalists to present “humbler, 
scientifically justifiable, and probabilistic conclusions.”63 But 
neither group presents any serious analysis of whether 
numerical presentations are preferable to arguably more 
comprehensible qualitative ones, and what to do when 
probabilities are not at hand is open to debate. Inasmuch as 
there is a growing literature on these matters, I shall content 
myself with commenting on a few specifics, mentioning a 
variety of approaches, and pleading for eclecticism. 
A. “Consistent-with” Testimony 
Fallacy calls on criminalists who report that two 
samples are “a match” or “consistent” to add that this “does not 
require a conclusion that the patterns share a common 
source.”64 To hammer home the point that other people or 
objects might match, Fallacy asks the witnesses to state that 
“in finding that two patterns match, they have placed the 
suspect object or person in a pool of one or more objects that 
match the evidentiary marks.”65 The take-home message would 
be, “we have a match, but we cannot say how many other 
people or things would match.”  
This “appropriate clarity and restraint” seems 
comparable to the weak presentation recommended by an NAS 
committee that reviewed the foundations for testimony about 
  
 62 NRC 2009, supra note 7, at 21-22. 
 63 Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 219. 
 64 Id. at 216; cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC 
ASSESSMENT OF BULLET LEAD ELEMENTAL COMPOSITION COMPARISON, FORENSIC 
ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 110 (2004) [hereinafter NRC 2004] (“The 
conclusions in laboratory reports should be expanded to include the limitations of 
compositional analysis of bullet lead evidence. In particular, a further explanatory 
comment should accompany the laboratory conclusions to readily portray the 
limitations of the evidence.”). 
 65 Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 216 (emphasis added). 
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the concentrations of various elements in bullet lead.66 The 
committee’s findings brought to a halt this use of analytical 
chemistry to associate bullet fragments with boxes of 
ammunition.67 The committee had proposed limiting the 
formerly exuberant statements of analysts to  
testimony that bullets from the same compositionally 
indistinguishable volume of lead (CIVL) are more likely to be 
analytically indistinguishable than bullets from different CIVLs. An 
examiner may also testify that having . . . evidence that two bullets 
are analytically indistinguishable increases the probability that two 
bullets come from the same CIVL, versus no evidence of match 
status.68 
In colloquial terms, the committee recommended testimony to 
the effect that it is more likely to find a match when bullets 
come from the same blob of molten lead than when they come 
from different blobs. Such statements might reasonably be 
made with respect to other forms of trace evidence. A cautious 
analyst could report that similarities in head hairs are more 
likely when the hairs come from the same scalp than when 
they come from different scalps.69 
  
 66 See NRC 2004, supra note 64. 
 67 Press Release, FBI Nat’l Press Office, FBI Laboratory Announces 
Discontinuation of Bullet Lead Examinations (Sept. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel05/bullet_lead_analysis.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 
2009). 
 68 NRC 2004, supra note 64, at 112. 
 69 In statistical jargon, this is a statement that the likelihood ratio or Bayes’ 
factor for the evidence exceeds one. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, §§ 12.4.2, 12.4.3. 
The 2009 NRC report implicitly endorses the use of more sharply defined likelihood 
ratios, at least for written reports. The report states that:  
Although some disciplines have developed vocabulary and scales to be used in 
reporting results, they have not become standard practice. This imprecision 
in vocabulary stems in part from the paucity of research in forensic science 
and the corresponding limitations in interpreting the results of forensic 
analyses. Publications such as Evett et al., Aitken and Taroni, and Evett 
provide the essential building blocks for the proper assessment and 
communication of forensic findings. 
NRC 2009, supra note 7, at 186 (citations omitted). The three authorities cited propose 
verbal scales for characterizing likelihood ratios. Two of them offer the following table 
for “reporting the value of the support of the evidence” (where V is the applicable 
likelihood ratio): 
1 < V ≤ 10    Limited evidence to support 
10 < V ≤ 100   Moderate evidence to support 
100 < V ≤ 1000   Moderately strong evidence to support 
1000 < V ≤ 10000  Strong evidence to support 
10000 < V    Very strong evidence to support 
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Neither of these approaches—the one-or-more-out-there 
statement nor the makes-it-more-likely assertion—clarifies 
how probative the evidence is. With bullet-lead comparisons, 
the jury might well be unduly impressed even with the modest 
statements of the results of inductively coupled plasma optical 
emission spectroscopy, which is the technique that gives the 
concentrations of the elements. This danger seems less when it 
comes to more mundane matters like the visual appearance of 
toolmarks and hairs. Thus, even though there is some risk of 
prejudice, this risk seems worth running with most forms of 
trace evidence, at least when compared with the alternative of 
entirely depriving the jury of a fair description of a relevant 
scientific finding.70 
The proposals to scale back forensic science testimony 
reflect the view that an expert testifies not as an advocate, but 
as the representative of a learned profession, conveying its 
knowledge, along with its limitations, to the jury. A neutral 
expert not seeking to overawe the jury would express the 
important limitations up front. This is an attractive ideal but 
difficult to realize in practice. Attorneys often urge expert 
witnesses to suppress all qualifications and reservations—the 
joke about the desirability of the “one-handed economist,” the 
one who won’t say “on the other hand . . . ,” comes to mind.71 
Whether criminalists can stake out and preserve the 
independence to use both hands is far from obvious. Perhaps 
the NAS recommendation for an enforceable code of ethics 
would provide the requisite backbone. Although I am not sure 
that the law needs to require the expert to express every caveat 
in direct examination, much would be gained if the legal 
system or the forensic science profession insisted on written 
laboratory reports containing all the cautions. An analyst who 
holds these back on direct examination should be easy to 
impeach with his or her own report. In addition, a cautionary 
instruction from the judge might be of assistance.72  
  
COLIN AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR 
FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 107 tbl.3.10 (2d ed. 2004) (citing IW Evett, G Jackson, JA 
Lambert & S McCrossan, The Impact of the Principles of Evidence Interpretation on the 
Structure and Content of Statements, 40 SCI. & JUSTICE 233, 236 (2000)). 
 70 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12.5.1. 
 71 Bartlett’s tentatively attributes the remark to President Truman. CLIFTON 
FADIMAN, & ANDRÉ BERNARD, BARTLETT’S BOOK OF ANECDOTES 542 (2000). 
 72 See, e.g., NRC 1996, supra note 26, at 197. 
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B. Rarity and Numerical Testimony 
Let us assume that the jury gets the message—a match 
is not an absolute identification. Can the criminalist do 
something more to explain its probative value? Obviously, this 
depends on what is known about the frequency of the 
identifying trait in the relevant population. Are the features 
very common, rarely seen, or somewhere in between? There 
will be occasions when such qualitative testimony is 
reasonable.73 When no duplicates have been seen after 
systematic, careful, and (one hopes) representative studies, a 
criminalist determined to refer to uniqueness might even 
assert that a trait is either unique or very rare in a population. 
Numerical estimates should generally be possible, but 
not necessarily from the kind of research and modeling that 
Saks and Koehler describe. Fallacy suggests that forensic 
scientists can devise probability models for complex patterns of 
trace-evidence characteristics, sample the frequency of each 
characteristic in relevant populations, verify the independence 
of the characteristics, and multiply to arrive at random-match 
probabilities for consumption by juries.74 This will not be easy. 
Unlike nuclear DNA evidence, which both the 2009 report and 
Fallacy present as a model for all of forensic science, other 
patterns can be more complex, can vary substantially by locale, 
or can change over time.75  
Perhaps a more useful paradigm will turn out to be 
mitochondrial DNA sequences. These are used in cases where 
sample quantities are minute or the DNA is highly degraded.76 
Mitochondrial DNA, which is found only in cytoplasm, 
reproduces asexually. Therefore, it is inherited from mother to 
child as a single unit.77 To give a numerical indication of the 
frequency of a lineage, the FBI maintains a collection of 
  
 73 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12.5.2. A related proposal is to describe 
the strength of the evidence (the likelihood ratio) with phrases such as those listed 
supra note 69. Indeed, an expert witness with adequate information could give 
qualitative characterizations of both rarity and the likelihood ratio. 
 74 Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 217-18. 
 75 Robert D. Koons & JoAnn Buscaglia, Forensic Significance of Bullet Lead 
Compositions, 50 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2005); Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 217-18. 
 76 A small number of human hairs often contain enough mitochondrial DNA 
for sequencing to succeed. DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 227-28 (2010). 
 77 The father merely contributes half of the nuclear DNA to the fertilized egg 
cell. Id. at 215. The cytoplasm is part of the mother’s egg cell. Id. 
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sequences from thousands of cases.78 It typically reports that 
the matching sequence in the case at bar has not been seen in 
this sample.79 For concreteness, suppose that the sample 
consists of 7000 sequences. When a defendant’s sequence is not 
in the database (which is the usual situation), one could say 
that so far it has been encountered one out of 7001 times.80 
There is ample room to argue that this number should not be 
taken too seriously. It does not come from a random sample, 
and it might not be representative of the population in the 
vicinity of the crime.81 Still, it gives the jury some sense of how 
rare the sequence is, and jurors should be able to appreciate 
the limitations of the number, especially when there is 
discussion of how many other people in the vicinity of the crime 
might share the sequence.82 
With a mitochondrial-DNA-sequence database, each 
new sample is compared to all the previous ones to estimate 
the match frequency, and we know how many distinct 
sequences have been observed to date. Estimating the 
probability of a rare event from case work is trickier, but 
  
 78 See State v. Pappas, 776 A.2d 1091, 1104, 1110 n.9 (Conn. 2001); Wagner 
v. State, 864 A.2d 1037, 1045 n.9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005); Keith L. Monson et al., The 
mtDNA Population Database: An Integrated Software and Database Resource for 
Forensic Comparison, 4 FORENSIC SCI. COMMC’NS, Apr. 2002, http://www.fbi.gov/ 
hq/lab/fsc/backissu/april2002/miller1.htm; Deborah Polanskey & Bruce Budowle, 
Summary of the Findings of a Quality Review of the Scientific Working Group on DNA 
Analysis Methods Mitochondrial DNA Database, 7 FORENSIC SCI. COMMC’NS, Jan. 
2005, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2005/research/2005research.htm. 
 79 See Pappas, 776 A.2d at 1104. 
 80 The upper confidence limit of the estimate also could be provided. The FBI 
does not do this. It quotes the upper bound of a 95% confidence interval above the 
proportion (0%) of the cases in which the sequence was previously seen. Id. at 1110 & 
n.11 (Conn. 2001). This is the “counting method” recommended in NRC 1992, supra 
note 22, at 75, to avoid any argument over the accuracy of multiplying individual 
probabilities with nuclear DNA. 
 81 See, e.g., Frederika A. Kaestle et al., Database Limitations on the 
Evidentiary Value of Forensic Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 
74-75 (2006). 
 82 Previous research by Koehler shows that when the expected number of 
matching individuals in a population is substantial, the “pool” formulation benefits 
defendants relative to the match-probability method. Jonathan J. Koehler, The 
Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom: How to Make DNA-Match Statistics Seem 
Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1280-81 (2001). But the “pool” 
method also can lead to disputes over the size of the relevant population, see David H. 
Kaye, Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis of DNA Database 
Trawls, 87 N. CAR. L. REV. 425, 431 (2009) [hereinafter Trawls], and to fractional 
numbers of people, which could be difficult for jurors to understand. KAYE ET AL., supra 
note 10, § 12.4.1(2). When presented with both “pool” numbers and the match 
frequency, mock jurors were not overwhelmed by the mitochondrial DNA evidence. 
David H. Kaye et al., Statistics in the Jury Box: Do Jurors Understand Mitochondrial 
DNA Match Probabilities?, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 797 (2007). 
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similar reasoning applies—and shows that failing to find any 
matches in a large number of comparisons of different objects 
can be quite informative.83 There are various methods for 
estimating the probability of an event that has occurred zero 
times in a sample of n observations—the “zero-numerator” 
problem.84 Applying the simplest of these, if a laboratory 
documented a zero numerator in 30,000 tests, it could infer a 
random-match probability of no more than 0.0001.85  
Naturally, there is a risk that the jury will draw too 
strong a conclusion from such a probability. This problem can 
be handled by cautioning the jury against inferring uniqueness 
or misconstruing the probability as a source probability. In 
addition, the quality of the estimate depends on the accuracy of 
the reported fraction of matching comparisons, the conditions 
under which the matches were made, and the analogy between 
a random sample and the casework or research sample.  
C. Source Testimony 
Experts in other fields routinely provide categorical 
statements. Pathologists opine as to the manner of death, 
psychologists to competence, and engineers to the cause of 
product failures. The law of evidence generally allows expert 
opinion testimony when it is well founded, but under normal 
relevance rules, existing theory and data on the discernible 
uniqueness of trace evidence typically are too weak to justify 
admission of an opinion that a pattern is unique.86 Contrary to 
  
 83 In assessing the probative value of a match, the sensitivity needs to be 
considered as well: How often do matches arise when the objects being compared are 
one and the same? See, e.g., V.L. Phillips et al., The Application of Signal Detection 
Theory to Decision-making in Forensic Science, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 294 (2001). 
 84 E.g., J.A. Hanley & A. Lipp-Hand, If Nothing Goes Wrong, Is Everything 
All Right? Interpreting Zero Numerators, 249 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1743, 1743 (1983); 
Thomas A. Louis, Confidence Intervals for a Binomial Parameter After Observing No 
Successes, 35 AM. STAT., 154, 154 (1981); Allan R. Sampson & Robert L. Smith, 
Assessing Risks Through the Determination of Rare Event Probabilities, 30 OPERATIONS 
RES. 839, 840-41 (1982); Robert L. Winkler et al., The Role of Informative Priors in 
Zero-Numerator Problems: Being Conservative Versus Being Candid, 56 AM. 
STATISTICIAN 1, 1 (2002). 
 85 This estimate uses 3/n as an approximate upper bound on the probability. 
B. D. Jovanovic & P. S. Levy, A Look at the Rule of Three, AM. STATISTICIAN, May 1997, 
at 137. The “counting method” proposed for DNA typing, with a confidence coefficient 
of 0.95, see supra note 80, is equivalent to this simple rule. 
 86 An expert might still be justified in reporting the reasons for thinking that 
the match is probative of identity. Statements such as “In my experience, different 
guns always give rise to different striations on the bullets” could be used in lieu of more 
precise studies, but unless the expert has meaningful experience in studying 
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recent federal district court opinions, experts should not be 
permitted to avoid the limitations in their knowledge simply by 
qualifying assertions of uniqueness with a fig leaf such as “to a 
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.”87 
But what if the record were stronger? As long as there is 
a nonzero probability of duplication or another swan to 
consider—as there always will be—such testimony apparently 
fails Fallacy’s exacting standard for statistical proof. As we 
have seen, however, this austere standard does not comport 
with normal scientific practice. In the DNA field, scientists 
have indicated that opinions of general uniqueness88 or 
uniqueness of a particular DNA type within some smaller 
region89 are or will soon become scientifically acceptable.90  
To be sure, there is disagreement over how and whether 
to ascertain a precise value of a probability of uniqueness,91 and 
  
mismatches for guns that did not actually produce the striations, undocumented 
references to “experience” may reveal more about the analyst’s state of mind than they 
do about the state of the world. When testimony is of the “I know it, but neither I nor 
anyone else has studied it systematically” variety, a strong argument can be made that 
juries will overvalue the testimony and that exclusion is appropriate to encourage more 
extensive research. 
 87 United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 375 (D. Mass. 2006) 
(holding that “the expert may testify that the cartridge cases were fired from a 
particular firearm to a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” even though the 
accuracy of these judgments is unclear and “the expert may not testify that there is a 
match to an exact statistical certainty”); see also United States v. Mouzone, No. WDQ-
08-086, 2009 WL 3617748, at *19-20 (D. Md. Oct. 29, 2009) (recommendations in 
magistrate’s report); United States v. Taylor, 663 F.Supp.2d 1170 (D.N.M. 2009); 
United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2007 WL 485967, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
12, 2007) (firearms toolmarks identification is admissible under Daubert, but “[t]he 
experts may not . . . testify to their conclusions ‘to the exclusion of all other firearms in 
the world.’ They may only testify that a particular bullet or cartridge case was fired 
from a particular firearm to a ‘reasonable degree of certainty in the ballistics field.’”). 
 88 See NRC 1996, supra note 26; NRC 1992, supra note 22; DANIEL L. HARTL 
& ANDREW G. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF POPULATION GENETICS 131 (3d ed. 1997) 
(“Matches at 7 to 9 [VNTR] loci are virtually definitive of identity—barring technical 
errors in the DNA typing itself (such as mislabeling of blood samples) and except for 
identical twins.”); B.S. Weir, Discussion of “Inference in Forensic Identification”, 158 J. 
ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y A 49 (1995) (“[T]he chance that two unrelated individuals in a 
population share the same 16-allele [VNTR] profile is vanishingly small, and even for 
full sibs the chance is only 1 in very many thousands.”). 
 89 Bruce Budowle et al., Source Attribution of a Forensic DNA Profile, FORENSIC 
SCI. COMMC’NS, July 2000, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2000/source.htm. 
 90 After reviewing this literature, one court agreed that “when a DNA method 
analyzes genetic markers at sufficient locations to arrive at an infinitesimal random 
match probability, expert opinion testimony of a match and of the source of the DNA 
evidence is admissible.” Young v. State, 879 A.2d 44, 45 (Md. 2005). 
 91 See David J. Balding, When Can a DNA Profile Be Regarded as Unique?, 
39 SCI. & JUSTICE 257, 257 (1999) (“The probability that a defendant’s DNA profile is 
unique in a population of untyped individuals is . . . bounded below by one minus twice 
the sum of the match probabilities over the population . . . . However, because of the 
problem of the non-DNA evidence, there seems to be no satisfactory way for an expert 
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no canon of scientific reasoning demands that experts focus 
directly on the question of uniqueness.92 DNA experts can 
continue with the present regime of giving the incredibly small 
random-match probabilities that imply uniqueness. They can 
multiply these numbers by some arbitrary population size and 
report that in the “pool,” some number of people (even a 
fractional number) would be expected to have the defendant’s 
genotype. But the numbers could be a hair’s breadth away from 
the statement that no unrelated person would be expected to 
share this profile. Why not, as one astute statistician asks, give 
“a ‘plain English’ statement . . . ? For example, perhaps an 
expert witness could assert that, excluding identical twins and 
laboratory/handling errors, in his/her opinion the defendant’s 
  
witness to address the question of uniqueness in court.”); Bruce Weir, Are DNA Profiles 
Unique?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH INT’L SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN IDENTIFICATION 
114, 116 (1998), available at http://www.promega.com/geneticidproc/ussymp9proc/ (“It 
is very difficult to arrive at a satisfactory probabilistic or statistical genetic theory 
which will give the probability that a second person in a population has the same DNA 
profile as the one featuring in a criminal trial” because of “possible dependencies 
between loci and between individuals.”). But see BALDING, supra note 34, at 138 (“A 
calculation of the probability of ‘uniqueness’ may also provide useful information for 
courts, proved that a satisfactory way is found to explain the underlying 
assumptions.”). 
 92 Cf. Saks & Koehler, supra note 13, at 218 n.94 (“[O]ffering source 
identifications at trial for sufficiently low probabilities would not be an implication of 
the science . . . .”). A scientific working group of the National Commission on the 
Future of DNA Evidence expressed the idea as follows: 
The statistical basis for individualization is discussed by Evett and Weir 
(1998, pp. 243-244). The concept of individualization has been supported by 
Balding (1999). The FBI procedure has been criticized by Weir (1999) and 
supported by Budowle, Chakraborty, et al. (2000). Whether this, or in fact 
any statistical procedure for defining individualization is defensible continues 
to be debated. The procedure provides one way to interpret discriminatory 
power (a scientific question) in terms of “a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty” (a subjective question). It is quite possible that within 5 years or 
less some such criterion will be accepted by the legal and forensic community, 
not as a scientifically appropriate statement, but as a practical definition for 
forensic purposes. 
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, RESEARCH & DEV. WORKING GROUP, 
THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 25-26 (2000). The committee was explaining that 
there is no strictly scientific criterion for deciding how small the random-match 
probability must be to warrant an opinion that a particular genotype is “effectively 
unique.” It stated that: 
Eventually, the probability becomes so small that the profile is effectively 
unique. The basis for concern would then be whether the techniques are 
adequate, the chain of custody is intact, the statistical treatment is 
appropriate, and no errors were made. But how small must such a probability 
be for a profile to be individualized? 
Id. 
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DNA profile is almost certainly unique in some appropriate 
population.”93  
Still other modes of presentation have been proposed.94 
My objective is not to argue for any one of them, but only to ask 
that the issue be decided by examining the ease of 
presentation, comprehensibility, and scientific defensibility of 
all of them. 
CONCLUSION 
Radical skepticism of all possible assertions of 
uniqueness is not justified. Absolute certainty (in the sense of 
zero probability of a future contradicting observation) is 
unattainable in any science. But this fact does not make 
otherwise well-founded opinions unscientific or inadmissible. 
Furthermore, whether or not global uniqueness is 
demonstrable, there are circumstances in which an analyst can 
testify to scientific knowledge of the likely source of an object or 
impression. The admissibility of particular source attributions 
thus should turn on the actual state of this knowledge as 
applied to the task at hand, and to the helpfulness to the judge 
or jury of this testimony as contrasted with alternative 
presentations of forensically valuable findings. The optimal 
format for explaining the logical impact of a match is not self-
evident. But it is clear that if forensic scientists are to 
contribute fully to the just resolution of criminal cases, they 
need a less absolutist and more nuanced theory of 
identification than the traditional presumption of 
characteristics that are intuitively judged to be 
individualizing.95 This is a fundamental—and fundamentally 
sound—message of the National Academy and of the broader 
academy. 
  
 93 BALDING, supra note 34, at 136. In “the minority of cases in which 
uniqueness cannot reasonably be asserted,” Balding proposes “a probability of 
uniqueness.” Id. But see supra note 91. A rough probability for uniqueness among 
unrelated individuals of the particular genotype in question could be provided in all 
cases. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12.4.1(2). 
 94 See, e.g., KAYE ET AL., supra note 10, § 12; Trawls, supra note 81. 
 95 See, e.g., Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to 
Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101 (2001); Saks & Kohler, 
supra note 13. 
